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Against Defaultism and Towards Localism in the Contingency/Inevitability 
Conversation: Or, Why We Should Shut up About Putting-Up
Abstract
Philosophers and historians of science have for some time now debated whether the results of 
current science are contingent or inevitable. Scholars have noted that inevitabilism often 
enjoys the status of a presumptive default position. Consequently, contingentists are, from the 
outset, lumbered with the burden of proof. This is evident in the case of the inevitabilist demand 
that the contingentist put up or shut up (PUSU). This paper adds to the existing case which 
says that inevitabilisms default-status is unjustified. However, whilst some have suggested 
that contingentism should replace inevitabilism as the default position, I argue that the 
contingency/inevitability (C/I) conversation should proceed sans default. This move is 
motivated largely by my claim that the C/I issue is best conceived as a local, rather than a 
global or universal one. The main problem with taking inevitabilism or contingentism as the 
default is the globalist nature of such a tack. Whilst localism is arguably an emergent reality of 
the growing C/I literature, its implications have not been fully realised. I suggest that fully and 
explicitly embracing localism, including the closely related move of doing away with defaults, 
represents the most promising way forward for the C/I conversation. In addition, I will show 
how these moves entail that we stop worrying about the inevitabilist PUSU demand, or more 
bluntly, that we shut up about putting-up.
Keywords
contingentism; inevitabilism; put up or shut up; defaultism; globalism; localism 
1. Introduction
Are the results of science contingent or inevitable? Has the historical development of science 
gone just as it should have  indeed the only way it could have? Or might things have gone 
differently?1 So formulated, the contingency/inevitability (C/I) issue resembles an either/or 
question; as though one must necessarily defend either contingentism or inevitabilism about 
the whole damn thing.2 This is not the case. Some of the most significant contributions to the 
literature since Ian Hackings original framing (1999; 2000) have addressed the need to specify, 
along various axes, the target and nature of a C/I claim.
Joseph Martins (2013) article, which purports to address a lingering ambiguity in the 
way contingency is defined (919), is one such contribution. In it, Martin proposes a taxonomy 
of contingency claims, organised according to the things within science considered to be 
1 A small but steadily growing body of literature engages these provocative questions; see especially, Soler, Trizio 
and Pickerings (2015) edited volume devoted to the C/I issue.
2 Thanks to Ian James Kidd for suggesting this snappy phrase.
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contingent and the factors they are presumed to be contingent upon (920).3 The taxonomy 
(927-28) differentiates between:
(A) Trivial contingency, concerning the details of scientists everyday lives
(B) Sociocultural contingency, concerning the social structures that constitute 
scientific activity
(C) Methodological contingency, concerning the experimental techniques, practices, 
instrumentation, etc., which constitute the ways in which we do science
(D) Interpretive contingency, or, the way scientists expound data in order to fill 
theoretical gaps
(E) Theoretical contingency, which says that scientific theories themselves and the 
claims they make about the world might have been different4
Another layer of complexity is added to the possibility-space of C/I claims by considering the 
factors upon which each of A through E are purported to be contingent, including everyday 
events, sociocultural contexts, methods, interpretations, theories (929). To deny the 
contingency of any of A-E is to adopt the corresponding inevitabilist stance.
E-type claims  the most controversial kind of contingentism  are our present concern. 
We can agree they are the most controversial variety of claim, as those inclined towards 
inevitabilism might happily admit various combinations of A-D, while objecting to E; our 
experimental methods, or the applications of our science might well be contingent, but any 
successful science would refer to genes, electrons, the constancy of the speed of light, etc. 
Unsurprisingly, E-type claims enjoy special attention from philosophers interested in the C/I 
issue. Several landmark papers in the C/I literature specifically address E-type claims, often 
grappling with the formulation which began the present essay: Are the results of science 
contingent or inevitable?5 We can roughly approximate Martins theoretical contingency 
category with claims about scientific results, which Léna Soler, an important commentator 
on the C/I issue, takes to include: whole theories; theoretical laws; theoretical entities; the 
values of physical magnitudes, and; experimental facts (2015b, 47).
When discussing whether these aspects of science could have been different given an 
alternative historical trajectory, the weight of presumption tends to fall on the side of 
inevitabilism. Contingentism is saddled with the burden of proof, whist inevitabilism enjoys 
default-status. Several scholars have identified and deplored this state of affairs (Soler, 2015b; 
Kidd, 2016), and in section 2 I build upon their foundation, offering a range of arguments 
3 Martins goal is to show, contra Hackings original framing, that C/I is a what question, rather than a how much 
question. He begins with John Beattys (2006) useful distinction between contingency as causal dependence, 
and contingency as unpredictability, or contingency per se. Contingency claims have tended to refer to causal-
dependence upon historical antecedents, and so invoke a sensitivity of the historical development of science to 
initial conditions. Meanwhile, the per se variety invokes stochasticity/unpredictability in the historical process. 
Claims of the latter kind are less common, though certain of Andrew Pickerings arguments (1984; 1995) provide 
notable exceptions. Hence, our focus will be on the causal-dependence variety.
4 I have added the A-E letters for ease of reference; they do not appear in Martin (2013).
5 This framing provides the title of articles by Soler (2008a) and Kinzel (2015), both published in this journal.
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toward the conclusion that inevitabilisms default-status is unjustified. In section 3, I tackle the 
question of whether a default position can ever be justified. This seems like a strange question, 
as default position can imply a certain lack of explicit justification or argumentation. Does 
not a default position, then, cease to be a default once we provide such a positive case? In 
tackling this issue I separate out two closely related issues at the heart of the C/I issue as it has 
played out in the literature: defaultism and globalism. For our purposes, the former consists of 
asserting a contingentist or inevitabilist position from the outset, or without argument, whilst 
the latter  treated more fully in section 4  consists in asserting a monolithic position (C or I) 
regarding the results of science generally. Proceeding in either mode, I will argue, is 
unacceptable. As such, I reject Ian James Kidds (2016, 15) suggestion that, having disposed 
with the inevitabilist default, we adopt contingentism as a general position about the results of 
science. One can debate whether or not Kidd is guilty of defaultism  the issue is not 
straightforward. In any case, we can reject his move on the basis of its explicit globalism. These 
two isms are closely related, and often manifest together. As we shall see, globalist positions, 
in a sense, all allow defaultism in by the back door.
Section 4 makes the case for the unacceptability of globalism with respect to the C/I 
issue, by drawing on recent contributions to the literature on scientific realism/anti-realism. I 
here characterise and challenge methodological globalism, and make the case for 
methodological localism in the C/I conversation. Science  including the results thereof  
is a far too complex and heterogeneous domain for us to expect that either contingentism or 
inevitabilism will apply globally, and we should not proceed as if this is our expectation. The 
C/I conversation must take place at a much more localised level, concerning particular fields 
of research, theories, or particular ontological posits. Whilst the growing number of zoomed-
in case studies in the C/I literature suggest that we are collectively embracing a localist 
methodology, I maintain that localisms implications for the nature and framing of the C/I 
problematic have yet to be fully realised, and as such, indicators of globalist thinking are 
detectable in the literature. 
The latter will be particularly evident in section 5, where I analyse the so-called put 
up or shut up (PUSU) demand, bequeathed to us by Ian Hacking. Faced with contingentist 
critique, Hacking explains, the inevitabilist is inclined to ask their interlocutor: if the results of 
science are indeed contingent and thus could have been otherwise, present a convincing 
example of an alternative science, meaningfully different from our actual science; put up or 
shut up! (1999, 79, 89; 2000, 70). Using Solers (2015b, 55-56) comprehensive reconstruction 
of the PUSU demand, I will highlight its reliance on the default-status of inevitabilism  a 
status put under severe challenge in section 2. Revisiting Hackings formulation of the PUSU 
demand will demonstrate its embeddedness within methodological globalism, which comes 
under attack in section 4. Doing away with defaults renders the inevitabilist PUSU demand, in 
most of its instantiations, a non-starter, whilst fully and consciously embracing localism means 
that the PUSU demand is replaced with indefinitely many PUSU demands  as many as there 
are potential targets for C/I claims. At this point, the distinctive argumentative and rhetorical 
force of the PUSU demand is almost entirely lost. Methodological localism renders any more 
globalist version of PUSU a non-issue.
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2. Inevitabilism: An undeserving default
On the question of whether the results of science are contingent or inevitable, Soler has 
observed that, for many people, inevitabilism is, as a matter of fact, the default position, or, 
in other words, a position that is intuitively (and often tacitly) assumed. Furthermore, due to 
inevitabilisms supposed prima facie plausibility, no need is felt of any quest for explicit 
justification insofar as no plausible alternative comes to threaten it. Accordingly, it is assumed 
that the burden of proof lies with contingentists (2015b, 56). This, despite the relative dearth 
of self-avowed inevitabilists in the wild; physicists Steven Weinberg and Sheldon Glashow 
represent the most frequently cited of a small band of outspoken advocates (e.g. Soler, 2008a, 
225-227). Few philosophers of science defend frank and explicit inevitabilist positions in such 
terms. Nevertheless, Soler explains that any philosopher of science interested in the 
contingentist/inevitabilist issue quickly experiences that the inevitabilist instinct is deeply 
entrenched and widely shared, including within philosophical, sociological, and historical 
analysts [sic] of science (2015b, 54).
Certainly, a number of historians of science have pronounced on the influence of 
inevitabilist thinking within their field.6 Greg Radick has for some time been pursuing 
counterfactual-historical work on biometry and Mendelism during the formative years of 
genetical science at the turn of last century (2005; 2016; Jamieson & Radick, 2013; 2017). He 
laments that, when it comes to imagining the possibilities for what a science of biological 
inheritance might have looked like, the weight of presumption has traditionally come down 
so much on the side of gene inevitabilism,  that gene contingentism has hardly had a look 
(2005, 26). Hasok Chang presents a similar situation: the so-called chemical revolution, 
during which Lavoisiers oxygen theory is supposed to have rapidly and comprehensively 
displaced earlier phlogistonist chemistries. While most scholars depict this episode as an 
inevitable victory for Lavoisierian chemistry over an inferior rival, Chang maintains that 
phlogiston theory had much going for it, and as such things could  perhaps should  have gone 
differently (2009; 2010; 2012). Both Radick and Chang identify, and seek to contest, a body 
of historiography which simultaneously assumes, and licenses belief in, the inevitability of the 
triumph of one scientific alternative over its competitor(s).
Moving from its historiography to science itself, Chang elsewhere diagnoses a 
dominant intuition among scientists that contingency in science is something harmful. He 
connects this to a strongly monist scientific education that many of us have received, 
meaning that contingency is either feared as a threat to scientific knowledge or relished in a 
rebellious spirit (2015, 362).7 The scientific and historiographical manifestations of the 
inevitabilist instinct are surely mutually reinforcing. A science shaped by a pervasive 
inevitabilist instinct will deeply influence the way in which that sciences history is written, 
and vice versa.8 This, as several commentators have bemoaned, is where we stand. We might 
6 John Henry (2008, 557), for example, explores how the historiographical practices of both positivists and social 
constructionists, in different ways, favour the view that modern science will turn out the same, come what may.
7 Changs remarks echo Solers diagnosis of a monist regime operative in science, past and present, and about 
which we shall hear more in section 5. 
8 Especially if, as was the case in our field until relatively recently, those doing science and those writing its 
history are the same people.
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hope that it is a state of affairs well justified; that there is good reason for the superior level of 
prima facie plausibility granted to inevitabilism concerning the results of science. We hope so, 
because the consequences run far and deep, in science, its historiography, and in the C/I 
conversation where contingentism is widely saddled with the burden of proof. The observations 
of Soler which began this section do not, however, inspire much optimism.
Part of the worry about inevitabilisms default-status is that explicit justification is 
lacking; it rests instead on an ill-defined feeling or sense (Kidd, 2016, 16). In the interest of 
a charitable discussion, we will temporarily afford inevitabilists the benefit of the doubt by 
examining the justifications they might put forward to ground the epistemically-privileged 
status of their position, even if in fact they rarely do. There appear to be at least three different 
potential justifications which might conceivably bestow upon inevitabilism an appreciable 
prima facie plausibility. Without claiming exhaustiveness, I shall briefly outline these options, 
and suggest why each fails to convincingly justify inevitabilisms default-status in the C/I 
conversation.
2.1. The pull-of-reality justification
We begin with the most obvious justification; what I am calling the pull-of-reality (POR).9 It 
goes something like this: The world just is a certain way, and it is the task of science to describe 
it. The world really is the way our best theories describe it, and the theoretical objects we posit 
really are out there. Science aims at uncovering truth, and if we do it well we will inevitably 
bump into natures true structure(s), sooner or later. For an example of a POR-inevitabilist in 
the wild, we need look no further than the progenitor of the C/I conversation, Ian Hacking, who 
states frankly:
I do not think the answers to live questions are contingent upon social considerations 
 I am saying, against my constructionist friends, that answers to live questions about 
the natural world have nothing to do with us (2000, 70).
Nothing to do with us, and everything, it seems, to do with the natural world.
As with all strong realist positions, POR-inevitabilism is undoubtedly risky to claim, 
and very difficult to argue (Soler, 2008a, 226). If one holds that all or most of our current 
science is inevitable (and will endure) given that it latches onto reality in some way, opponents 
might swiftly  and in the spirit of Larry Laudans (1981) pessimistic meta-induction  point 
to a scientific past littered with discarded theories, positing entities and processes we now 
consider not to exist in nature, but which were (sometimes greatly) successful in their own 
times, on their own terms. Why assume, then, that the current results of science will stick 
around indefinitely? The scientific theories which presently dominate may well appear to give 
the best account of their respective domains of nature, compared with any past attempt or 
9 Many commentators have noted the affinity between realism on the one hand, and inevitabilism on the other. 
The relationship, though, appears to be a matter not of logic but of psychology; Radick (2005, 47).
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present minority alternative.10 But as Kyle Stanford suggests in outlining his problem of 
unconceived alternatives, present theorists are no better able to exhaust the space of serious, 
well-confirmed possible theoretical explanations of the phenomena than past theorists have 
turned out to be. Thus, better alternatives may be out there in principle, as they demonstrably 
were for past thinkers  we just have not conceived of them yet (2006, 4). The above meta-
inductions from sciences long-run development are not necessarily fatal to the POR-
inevitabilist, but they do put pressure on the legitimacy of resting inevitabilisms default-status 
upon a strong realism which is, at present, far from established.11
One might instead hold, like physicist Steven Weinberg (1993), that whilst much 
current scientific knowledge might not latch onto the realities of nature, eventually, we will 
converge on a final theory which does. However, for this to be so, either scientific decisions 
must be made on the basis of the highly problematic notion of closeness/approximation to truth, 
or else, in Andrew Pickerings words, the POR-inevitabilist must hold that:
the situatedness and path dependence [of scientific practice]  somehow (and 
sometimes) wash out, so that scientific knowledge eventually converges on a mirroring 
relation to nature, independently of where scientific practice starts and whatever 
direction it sets off in. I can only note that nothing in my analysis points to such an 
erasure of situatedness and path dependence (1995, 185, note 6).
A huge challenge for the final theory POR-inevitabilist is to show how the unfathomably varied 
systems of science, grounded in disparate material and conceptual practices and concrete 
technical knowledges, put towards a plethora of practical and intellectual goals, and employing 
an array of virtues for measuring success in these tasks, could possibly (never mind inevitably) 
converge on a true (whatever this might mean) mirroring relation to nature. I do not assert 
the impossibility of this task; merely that much work is to be done for POR-inevitabilism to 
legitimately command substantial initial credibility.12
2.2. The uniqueness-rationality justification
A thoroughgoing commitment to realism need not, though, be the grounding for 
inevitabilism.13 Talk of rationality, for instance, can serve in its place. Restricting their 
10 Perhaps, though, the perceived superiority of actual science is itself contingent upon its historical dominance. 
The very data available to us for adjudicating alternatives are laden with the actual theory that has happened to 
be dominant. Consequently, any theory which happened to become dominant will come to appear inevitable given 
its superior (but unsurprising) ability to account for the data (which were collected/constructed under its own 
dominion). See Radick (2005, 40-44); also, Hacking (1992); Kidd (2015, 16). 
11 One might also note the recent challenges made to the very notion of adopting a global realism of the kind 
POR-inevitabilism seemingly rests upon; see section 4.
12 Add to this: the extrapolation into the future involved in the Weinbergian final theory claim is without 
justification, and may fairly be characterised as based on faith alone. 
13 Radick (2005, 23-25), points out one may occupy any of the four positions entailed by adopting inevitabilism 
or contingentism on the one hand, and realism or anti-realism on the other. Indeed, Soler (2008a, 222), notes that 
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ntion to local scientific decisions and consensuses  e.g., regarding whether a significant 
result has been achieved  Soler (2008a, 223) and Kinzel (2014; 2015), have both pointed to 
what I call uniqueness-rationality (UR) as a potential grounding of inevitabilism. Kinzel 
writes:
Regarding a specific scientific result we can then ask whether it had to emerge or be 
accepted given the reliable operation of scientific rationality and methodology, or 
whether the processes of scientific consensus formation were such as to allow for more 
than one rationally acceptable outcome. The inevitabilist embraces the first option and 
the contingentist the second (2014, 18-19, my emphasis).14
The above says nothing of scientific realism. Inevitabilists about scientific closure ground their 
position in the assumption that rational considerations and the available evidence determine a 
unique choice, such that local factors never become relevant for the decision at issue. Closure-
contingentists do not argue that scientific decisions are irrational, but rather that multiple 
outcomes will typically be rationally acceptable, and hence local factors must play a role in 
selecting a unique outcome (104).15 Harry Collins (1985) arguments concerning the purported 
detection of gravity waves in the 1970s represent a contingentism of this variety. Allan 
Franklins response (1994) exemplifies the corresponding UR-inevitabilist stance.
For proponents of UR-inevitabilism such as Franklin to establish its credibility they 
must, according to Kinzel, show that the kind of epistemic flexibility granted by 
confirmational, or Duhemian, holism is not genuinely available to scientists during episodes 
of scientific closure. Indeed, successfully rejecting this holism constitutes a minimal 
requirement for inevitabilism about scientific closure to be considered a plausible option 
(2014, 104). Kinzel shows, however, that the UR-inevitabilists most promising lines of 
challenge all beg the question against confirmational holism, as each requires or assumes the 
existence of some stable background, a given that is not subject to possible transformation or 
modification in the face of recalcitrant evidence (105). Yet it is this very notion which 
confirmational holism denies. Again, my suggestion is not that UR-inevitabilists will fail 
indefinitely to establish plausible grounds for their position; I merely note the present lack of 
such grounds. 
2.3. The in-the-air justification
A third potential grounding for inevitabilism invokes the necessity of certain scientific 
developments, given wider historical/social/cultural trends; one might claim that a particular 
development was in the air (ITA).16 To some readers, this will strike as the most obviously 
many contingentist positions are realistically-framed in that they aim to display contingency within a perceived 
relation between how the world is, and what science says about the world, whilst implicitly granting the 
cogency of such a relation.
14 Kinzels analysis is set out comprehensively in her unpublished doctoral thesis (2014). Thanks to Katherina for 
sharing this with me.
15 Though, as Kidd has emphasised to me, it is well-established that our bias-ridden epistemic practices fall short 
of idealised standards of rational cognitive performance. Thats not a slight at scientific rationality; it is merely 
a recognition of our limited  though impressive  cognitive capabilities as situated human agents.
16 Darwins theory of evolution by natural selection is a classic subject of ITA-inevitabilism. Aside from the 
question of whether natural selection is real ITA-inevitabilism is neutral on the realism issue  some historians 
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tic of the three groundings for inevitabilism, given that ITA-inevitabilism seems to 
espouse an unapologetic overdeterminism about history. According to Steve Fuller, historical-
overdeterminists believe that Y had to happen, but it need not have happened via X. 
Underdeterminists, meanwhile, maintain that X need not have happened, but once it did Y 
had to happen (2008, 581).
POR- and UR-inevitabilism are both also overdeterministic. However  and despite 
their shortcomings  their overdeterminism at least follows from considerations clearly 
befitting an inevitabilist position; be it the pull-of-reality, or the purported uniqueness of 
rational scientific outcomes. In ITA-inevitabilism, however, a decisive role is bestowed upon 
social and cultural considerations; an irony since contingentism and constructivism have been 
derided by some traditional thinkers for just this reason. Furthermore, sociocultural 
considerations are widely considered contingent, as they could have been different. ITA-
inevitabilists can either go along with this, claiming outcomes are inevitable, given such-and-
such (contingent) sociocultural factors, or they can hold that these factors are not contingent, 
but are in fact inevitable. The former move results in a rather vapid position, labelling as 
inevitable that which most would label contingent.17 Opting for the latter takes us from a claim 
about inevitability in sciences development to a much broader one concerning human history 
generally  a move we must not make lightly.
3. New default or no default?
The basis of inevitabilisms default-status in the C/I conversation often appears to be little more 
than instinct or intuition. We have now seen that the prospects of an explicit, reasoned case for 
the prima facie plausibility of inevitabilism are rather bleak at present. So far, then, it appears 
I am open to the implication that, should sufficiently good reasons for adopting inevitabilism 
(or contingentism!) as default be forthcoming, then inevitabilism (or contingentism) could 
deservedly occupy the default position in the conversation over the inevitability/contingency 
of the results of science, and hence the burden of proof would fairly and reasonably fall upon 
those challenging the default. I will now consider whether this is a desirable state of affairs for 
the C/I conversation going forward.
Let us agree, based on the foregoing, that no good case for inevitabilism-as-default has 
been presented in the literature, and as such, that inevitabilism is undeserving of the default-
status it widely enjoys. An obvious next move would be to argue that contingentism take 
inevitabilisms place. Indeed, we can read Kidd, in his (2016) essay Inevitability, contingency, 
and epistemic humility, as advocating just such a move. After disposing with inevitabilism, 
have argued that its emphasis upon the competitive struggle between individuals reflects the values of the rising 
industrial classes of Victorian England, to which Darwin belonged. As such, natural selection was a product of 
this time and place, and if not Darwin, then someone within a similar milieu would inevitably have forwarded 
similar ideas, which were in-the-air. For details and criticisms, see Radick (2003) and Bowler (2008; 2013).
17 I have no problem as such with the notion of qualifying inevitabilist claims with various conditionals. However, 
to move from the fact that one can reliably arrive at inevitabilism given enough conditionals, to the global prima 
facie plausibility of inevitabilism, seems disingenuous. Similar issues arise in section 4.
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ms question facing us is not whether the results of science are 
contingent or inevitable, but rather, how contingentist ought we be? (2016, 15). His case is 
built upon the notions of epistemic humility and hubris as developed by David Cooper 
(2002). Kidd argues compellingly that inevitabilist stances are epistemically hubristic and 
should thus be rejected. Any kind of interesting inevitabilism, he explains, must presuppose 
that its claims regarding the necessity of scientific results can be established in a sufficiently 
warranted manner. Otherwise, he goes on, inevitabilism can only gesture to, but never 
actually assert, the inevitability of whichever scientific results interest them  and this is a 
poor sort of inevitabilism. This presupposition, Kidd points out, rests upon hubristic 
estimations of our epistemic capabilities. Exhibiting the inevitability of scientific results 
requires also establishing the inevitability of the relevant questions, assumptions, concepts, 
methods, practices, disciplinary cultures, institutional structures and so on, which facilitated 
the actualisation of the results (2016, 13). A vast body of historical and sociological 
scholarship, however, overwhelmingly points to the role of chance and historical contingency 
in the emergence of just these conditions; it is hubris on the inevitabilists part, Kidd contends, 
to imagine that they can demonstrate otherwise. However, to bite the bullet and maintain that 
a scientific result was inevitable given these various contingent conditionals is, for Kidd, to 
simply collapse into contingentism.
The upshot is that inevitabilism  so widely afforded default-status  is epistemically 
hubristic and should thus be rejected.18 Our conclusions so far are similar, though arrived at by 
different routes. Kidd reasons that inevitabilists implicitly presuppose that their claims about 
the results of science are able to be established in a sufficiently warranted manner. This is 
not the case, according to Kidd, and so inevitabilisms are hubristic, and ought to be dismissed. 
I think it is reasonable for Kidd to hope that inevitabilists would try  or at least recognise the 
need  to establish their claims. However, we are perhaps destined for disappointment, given 
the pervasive and entrenched inevitabilism-as-default supposition in the C/I discourse. For 
what its worth, I think it is more likely that inevitabilists tend not to see the need to establish 
their claims, which appear to them to be self-evident and prima facie highly plausible (a 
presumption which section 2 invalidated).19
Having dethroned inevitabilism for reasons of epistemic hubris, Kidd proposes that in 
its place we crown contingentism, a position which he argues exemplifies great epistemic 
humility. For starters, the contingentist stance invites us to critically enquire into the grounds 
of our confidence when making certain claims  about the inevitability of certain scientific 
results, and the concepts, methods, practices, and so on upon which they are contingent (Kidd, 
2016, 16). Secondly, we are better positioned to identify and take seriously alternative 
epistemic possibilities, including in the historical development of scientific enquiry; thus, we 
will better appreciate the complexity and contingency of our knowledge-making practices 
18 Kidd also argues that the inevitabilists PUSU demand is hubristic. I will delay discussion of this until section 
5.
19 Recall Solers remarks (2015b, 56), which we heard in section 2: for many people, inevitabilism is, as a matter 
of fact, the default position, or, in other words, a position that is intuitively (and often tacitly) assumed. 
Furthermore, due to inevitabilisms supposed prima facie plausibility, no need is felt of any quest for explicit 
justification insofar as no plausible alternative comes to threaten it (my emphasis). 
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(16-17). For Kidd, all of this necessitates we do the epistemically humble thing and adopt 
contingentism, allowing us to move away from the contingentism versus inevitabilism 
question, and consider instead the variety, strength, and degree of our contingentism.
I will suggest here an alternative move. Instead of crowning contingentism, we should 
do away with defaultism. That is, we should not adopt any one position  inevitabilism nor 
contingentism  from the outset. In this, am I simply urging good old-fashioned agnosticism?20 
In one sense, yes, but it is a very particular sense. Before fleshing this out, I should first note 
the potential worry over whether it is fair and reasonable to read Kidd as advocating 
contingentism-as-default, in that doing so implicitly equates his position with that of 
inevitabilists who uncritically assert the default-status of their own position on the basis of an 
instinct or feeling.21 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines default (noun) as: A usual, customary, or 
standard option, course of action, etc., esp. one adopted or reverted to in the absence of 
conscious choice or viable alternatives.22 Kidds is certainly a conscious choice, and he clearly 
does not see inevitabilism as a viable alternative; a claim towards which he provides sustained 
and compelling arguments. In this sense, it perhaps is unfair to equate his position with the 
inevitabilism-as-default orthodoxy criticised in section 2, especially as Kidd explicitly 
forwards reasoned arguments for the superiority of contingentism, rather than falling back on 
an instinct, sense or feeling. Both positions, though, are of a kind in a more general sense. What 
I wish to focus on here, more than whether the label of default is fitting, is that both the 
inevitabilism-as-default orthodoxy, and Kidds contingentism-as-default alternative  however 
thoughtfully argued they might be  are (relatively) global positions. They each suggest, from 
the outset, that we adopt the same position, be it inevitabilism or contingentism, about the 
results of science generally.23 The parenthetical relatively serves to acknowledge this, along 
with the sliding scale that exists between the global and the local. From the perspective of 
methodological localism, the default label is fitting for Kidds position, because by taking a 
stance on the results of science generally, it implicitly takes a stance on individual instances  
particular scientific results  prior to careful historical-philosophical exploration of such 
instances. It is thus  like the inevitabilism-as-default orthodoxy  a methodologically globalist 
position, and an instance of defaultism.
The next section will outline the alternative, methodologically localist approach to the 
C/I problem. Whilst C/I scholars have embraced localism to a certain extent, they have not, I 
suggest, gone far enough. In a sense, the localist approach entails initial agnosticism at the level 
of the results of science, taken together. This is the very particular sense in which I said I 
am urging agnosticism. What I am suggesting is not simply that we do away with default 
20 In doing so I would be in good company. Elliott Sober (2005) decries unjustified defaults and champions 
agnosticism in the debate over the employment of Morgans Canon in research on animal cognition, whilst 
William Bausman and Marta Halina (2018) make similar arguments concerning what they call pseudo-null 
hypotheses in community ecology and comparative psychology.
21 I thank Soler for drawing my attention to this important worry.
22 Entry on default, n. in Oxford English Dictionary Online (2018).
23 Going back to Martins scheme, it seems likely that Kidd would defend contingentism concerning A-D. If, then, 
he also proposes a global contingentism about the results of science (E-type), then his is indeed a contingentism 
about the whole damn thing.
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positions, but that we do away with (relatively) global defaults pertaining to the results of 
science generally. Instead, we must go local.
This change in tack suggests we should not worry ourselves over the merits of various 
arguments for this or that global default; they are simply not part of the C/I landscape once we 
embrace methodological localism. Before closing the door on this issue, then, I will note two 
things. Firstly, as reasons for a (relatively) global default go, Kidds seem to be rather good 
ones. Humility is certainly an admirable virtue, and hubris a vice. But there are many ways to 
be humble. Methodological localism, as we shall see, is one of them. Secondly, why, if I am 
not interested in arguing over the justification of default positions, did I spend section 2 
challenging the potential justifications of inevitabilism-as-default? Why did I not save myself, 
and the reader, some time, and begin with my case for going local? My reasons for proceeding 
as I have are twofold, and intimately connected. 
First off, uncritically taking inevitabilism as the default position in the C/I conversation 
is the orthodoxy. My sustained criticism of the orthodoxy will, I hope, be of use in motivating 
a collective move away from it. Relatedly, I do not want the tendency to unthinkingly install 
inevitabilism as default to follow us when, in the next section, we challenge another 
orthodoxy  methodological globalism  and go local. That is, without first systematically 
challenging the legitimacy of inevitabilisms claim to default-status, there might have been a 
danger that inevitabilism would serve as a local default in each particular instance, as we set 
out to examine the results of science case-by-case. Without further ado, let us move on to my 
case for going local in the C/I conversation.
4. Going local
Taxonomies of contingency claims, such as Martins (2013) which we met in the introduction, 
make it abundantly clear that the C/I issue is not as simple as debating whether science is 
contingent or inevitable; C/I claims can be made about lots of different aspects of science.24 
Indeed, C/I claims have been made about lots of different aspects of science.25 An emphasis on 
the local, then, seems to be an emergent reality in the C/I literature. Nevertheless, I will suggest 
that we are in need of some clarity, methodologically-speaking, on where this leaves the C/I 
conversation.
Martin (2013, 919) professed to address a lingering ambiguity in defining the 
concepts at the heart of the C/I issue. In a sense, I want to do similar. Recall Martins 
24 Martins taxonomising efforts have been fruitfully elaborated upon by Kinzel (2015, 62-65). Her four-
dimensional scheme retains the need to specify a C/I claims target, whilst also addressing issues such as: the 
nature of the alternative to actual science that is under consideration (is it only a logically possible alternative, a 
genuine historical alternative, etc.?); how we assess alternatives (are they equally/unequally successful? For what 
purposes? etc.), and; how alternatives are related to one another (are they logically, or ontologically incompatible? 
Or incommensurable? etc.).
25 See Soler (2015a, 7-8), for a distillation of the highly diversified cases discussed in Science as it could have 
been. Case-studies include, e.g., Michel Bitbol and Claire Petitmengin (2015) on the (quasi-) disappearance of 
introspection in psychology, and Yves Gingras (2015) on the discovery of electron diffraction.
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terisation of theoretical contingency (E-type) claims: scientific theories themselves and 
the claims they make about the world might have been different (928). Notice that it is not 
made entirely clear whether E-type claims pertain to scientific theories generally (i.e., a C/I 
claim about all/most scientific theories), or whether Martin is categorising together all claims 
which are about particular instances of scientific theories being contingent/inevitable. In other 
words, it is unclear whether this category of claims covers (relatively) globalist theses about 
the contingency/inevitability of all or most scientific theories, or rather localist theses 
pertaining to particular scientific theories, without the presumption that the conclusion in each 
case can be extended beyond the confines of that case. Elsewhere, Soler has observed that one 
can be contingentist about a certain kind of element [of science] but inevitabilist about another 
kind (2015a, 7). Such remarks are commonplace and suggest a certain openness to localism. 
The talk of kinds of elements - examples of which might include physical constants, natural 
laws, fundamental equations, theoretical entities, to name but a few  does, however, somewhat 
temper the localist sentiment. Soler seems to be talking in terms of contingentist/inevitabilist 
theses about kinds such as these, rather than theses about particular tokens of these kinds. It 
would be entirely consistent, however, for us to be contingentist about one token of the 
theoretical entity kind  say, genes in biology  but inevitabilist about another token of that 
kind  say, electrons in physics.26 Perhaps I am merely nit-picking, and possibly the localist 
interpretation of Martins E-type category is implicit. Perhaps Soler would be happy to modify 
her remark so that it speaks about particular elements rather than kinds of elements. We can 
and should be explicit in these matters. To see why, and to clarify what I mean by 
localism/globalism, we will take another detour outside of the C/I realm. 
4.1. Going local in the scientific realism debate
Traditionally, scientific realist and anti-realist positions have been characterised as global, 
rather than local ones.27 Scientific realism, we often hear, involves belief in the (approximate) 
truth of our best scientific theories, whilst anti-realism holds that such belief is unwarranted. 
Note the globalism at play on each side of the dichotomy: a single epistemic attitude is adopted 
towards theories throughout all those domains we call science.28 This globalism is 
characteristic of many of the realism-relevant stances developed in the literature. Entity realism 
recommends belief in the theoretical entities which appear in our best science; structural 
realism recommends belief in the structures in our best science; constructive empiricism 
recommends agnosticism concerning the reality of unobservables (even) in our best science, 
and so on. As Jamin Asay (2016) puts it, these are all first-order globalist stances on the realism 
issue. The position adopted covers many or most instances of a kind of element of science. 
26 Relatedly, Catherine Allamel-Raffin and Jean-Luc Gangloff wonder whether certain scientific sub-fields are 
more amenable to contingentist interpretation than others (2015, 105). If so, the risk involved in extrapolating C/I 
conclusions beyond disciplinary boundaries is heightened.
27 Globalism is sometimes referred to as universalism. Wholesale vs. retail represents an alternative term for the 
global/local dichotomy. Confusingly, Mohamed Elsamahi (2005) uses localized realism to denote what others 
call selective realism. I stick to the meaning of local realism in Asay (2016) and Henderson (2018).
28 Sometimes with the qualification that the science must be mature. Even if we are minimally charitable, and 
grant that only physics is mature, this still captures a huge variety of fields/sub-disciplines.
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Furthermore, attempts to support these stances are most often methodologically globalist. That 
is, the arguments provided are presumed to apply for all (mature, successful) science, even if 
made on the basis of one or a small handful of particular cases from specific scientific domains. 
As Asay notes, the central arguments for and against realism  i.e., Putnams (1975) no 
miracles argument, and Laudans (1981) pessimistic meta-induction  are methodologically 
globalist. The former addresses the success of science in general, whilst the latter moves 
from particular historical cases towards a general philosophical anti-realist thesis. Proceeding 
in either of these modes assumes either the general applicability of ones arguments, or else 
some fundamental similarity of unexamined to examined cases. 
Riding a small wave of momentum in the literature, Asay (2016) defends an alternative 
localist approach to the realism issue (see Magnus & Callendar, 2004; Saatsi, 2010; 2017; 
Henderson, 2018). This change of tack does not entail disposing with the various positions 
developed in the realism debates long history  entity realism, structural realism, constructive 
empiricism, etc. They still have a place in the localist landscape, just without the globalist 
expectation that any one doctrine is applicable to all science. One must examine each scientific 
domain on its own merits and decide which realism-relevant stance is most appropriate to 
adopt in that domain. How zoomed-in these domains should be is an open, empirical question. 
It may turn out that the same stance can be adopted regarding an entire discipline, or only at 
the level of an individual theory, or at some even lower level. To approach the issue this way 
is to adopt methodological localism. If it turns out that, say, structural realism provides the 
most appropriate account of fundamental physics, whilst entity realism captures best some 
other domain, in neurobiology perhaps (the logical space of possible combinations is vast), 
then one will have arrived at a first-order localism. In Asays words:
The best way to come to the truth about scientific realism is to explore each branch of 
science individually on its own metaphysical and epistemological terms. The result of 
such enquiries could be a first-order globalism  Even if this turns out to be the case, 
we will have arrived at that fact more honestly and appropriately if we adopt 
methodological localism (2016).
It is in this sense that, as I suggested in the previous section, to adopt methodological 
localism is one way to be humble. In advocating this methodological approach to the C/I issue, 
we can draw on the reasons Asay provides for doing so in the realism debate. The most relevant 
for our purposes, and the most potent by Asays reckoning, is the rampant diversity of 
science. The various systems of practice we call sciences are extraordinarily diverse in their 
aims, methodologies, material and experimental cultures, and notably the kinds of things they 
study.29 Our mature scientific theories are products of this incredible diversity of practices, 
and they attempt to account for a baffling array of different kinds of phenomena. The search 
for a single, unified scientific method has long been abandoned, as has that for anything beyond 
a sociological criterion of what constitutes science. We dont, then, find ourselves in a very 
strong position to assert from the outset  that is, in a defaultist manner  that we should adopt 
29 For an extreme contrast, consider the differences between historical and experimental sciences, along the 
dimensions listed.
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the same epistemological stance globally, i.e., towards all mature/successful scientific 
theories.
4.2. Going (even more) local in the C/I conversation
Rampant diversity in the sciences is not news to those invested in the C/I issue. It is 
acknowledged implicitly by those, like Soler, who observe that [a]n indefinitely wide variety 
of targets at different scales and in different scientific fields can be the object of 
contingentist/inevitabilist claims (2015a, 7; see also 2008a, 222), and explicitly by Allamel-
Raffin and Gangloff (2015), for whom it is possible that contingentism accounts for certain 
scientific sub-fields better than others (see my note 26). Indeed, the diversity argument 
arguably applies even more strongly in the C/I case than in the realism case; claims in the latter 
realm tend to focus only on theoretical entities, whereas C/I claims, as we saw in Martins 
taxonomy, can be directed at almost any aspect of science, thus greatly increasing the diversity 
of targets. Even restricting ourselves to claims about the results of science,  which include 
among other things whole theories, theoretical laws, theoretical entities, the values of physical 
magnitudes, and experimental results (Soler, 2015b, 47)  the C/I-scholar is still arguably 
presented with greater diversity of potential targets than the realist/anti-realist.
But we can add further to the case for methodological localism. Recall Asays 
admission that in the realism case, it is possible that methodological localism will end in a first-
order globalism. Is an eventual first-order globalism similarly possible in the C/I case? I am 
made sceptical by the conceptual nature of contingency and inevitability  by contrast with that 
of realism and anti-realism. Take temporality: realist/anti-realist claims typically refer to a 
particular, static time-slice (often, now). Confronted with a claim that this or that element of 
science is/is not real, we would not usually ask when? Given what historical conditions? 
Realists ordinarily want to assert the permanent and enduring reality of their chosen target. 
Contingency claims, however, are inherently historical and, thus, spatiotemporally situated. 
We say that X is contingent upon such and such historical conditions. What about claims of 
inevitability? Many inevitabilists  especially POR-inevitabilists  want to assert the 
inevitability of their chosen target tout court. Toward rendering inevitabilist claims more 
empirically tractable, Ronald Giere has suggested an historicised understanding of 
inevitability.30 On this view, a scientific result or consensus becomes inevitable when there 
are no remaining plausible contingencies to divert it (2015, 188). Thus, a scientific result 
which was contingent at a given moment in history, might over time become inevitable, or 
more provocatively, a result that was once inevitable might later be overturned (2015, 188; 
see also Allamel-Raffin & Gangloff, 2015, 106-7; Gingras, 2015). On Gieres picture, not only 
the whats but also the whens (and there are indefinitely many) greatly diversify the possibility-
space of inevitability, as well as contingency claims.31 If individual cases are temporally 
situated in the strong sense that adjusting the time-conditional could alter our conclusion as to 
30 More approaches to making inevitabilism tractable will be discussed in section 6.
31 This is not the case for standard realists in the realism/anti-realism debate who want to maintain the mind-
independent existence of unobservables (though, we might speak of our knowledge of an entitys reality being 
temporally emergent).
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whether the same scientific result was contingent/inevitable, we can hardly expect a first-order 
globalism about scientific results to emerge! 
If Gieres historicised understanding of inevitability should prove a little exotic for 
some tastes, we can recall as well that much besides temporality requires qualification. Kidd 
explains that inevitabilist claims implicitly hold constant relevant questions, assumptions, 
concepts, methods, practices, disciplinary cultures, institutional structuresand so onall of 
which are, of course, subject to their own contingencies (2015, 13). The implications drawn 
from the need for these conditionals are often negative. For Hacking, they render inevitabilist 
claims close to an empty platitude (2000, 66), whilst for Kidd they collapse the distinction 
between contingentism and inevitabilism (2016, 13). For our present purposes, we can simply 
note that if these conditionals do anything, they add immeasurably to the diversity of possible 
C/I claims, which in turn bolsters the case for localism. They certainly bar us from extrapolating 
from local contingentisms/inevitabilisms to a global position, and thus make it rather difficult 
to imagine moving by methodological localism towards a first-order-globalism. If we have 
determined that X was contingent at T1 but by T2 it had become inevitable, how can we move 
from these particular claims to a globalist one about the contingency/inevitability about results 
of science in general? 
Just as the appropriateness of, say, entity realism concerning electrons should not move 
us to embrace entity realism globally, the conclusion that a particular scientific result was 
contingent/inevitable says little about the rest of science, including other results of the same 
kind (other theoretical entities, or experimental results, or whatever). Finally, that the 
possibility of arriving at a first-order globalism regarding the C/I issue appears vanishingly 
small provides an additional damning argument against (global) defaults of the kind criticised 
in sections 2 and 3. Defaultism and globalism are closely linked and mutually reinforcing, and 
the C/I conversation will benefit from explicitly disposing with both. The next section deals 
with what is perhaps their most salient manifestation: the inevitabilist PUSU demand.
 
5. Shutting up about putting up
The PUSU demand is as old as the C/I conversation itself. Both began life in Ian Hackings 
(1999) book, The Social Construction of What? In an attempt to distil points of genuine 
philosophical importance from the so-called science wars of the 1990s, Hacking introduced 
two warring factions: the inevitabilists and the contingentists. Faced with contingentist critique, 
we hear, the inevitabilist is inclined to ask their interlocutor: if the results of science are indeed 
contingent and could thus have been otherwise, to present a convincing example of an 
alternative science, meaningfully different from our actual science. In Hackings memorable 
phrase, the inevitabilist challenges the contingentist to put up or shut up (PUSU) (1999, 79, 
89; 2000, 70). Only recently have authors  Soler (2015b) and Kidd (2016)  provided extended 
analysis of the PUSU demand. Both conclude that we should not worry about it. I concur. 
Whilst their reasons differ, both hinge on PUSU being unanswerable in certain ways. I hold 
instead that it is unaskable. The PUSU demand, as I will demonstrate, is symptomatic of 
defaultism and globalism. I have argued in the preceding sections that these -isms be 
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explicitly rejected. Doing so, I will argue, renders the inevitabilist PUSU demand as it presently 
stands, a non-issue. I will summarise Kidds, then Solers, reasons for shutting up about putting 
up (SUPU), before elaborating my own.
5.1. SUPU: Kidd and Solers reasons
As we saw in section 3, Kidd charges inevitabilism with epistemic hubris. His rejection of 
PUSU follows suit. Implicit in the demand, Kidd explains, is the put-up presumption (PUP), 
which holds that it is actually possible, both in practice and in principle, for the contingentist 
to attempt to put up (2016, 14). The PUP, however, is incompatible with the practical and 
social realities of scientific enquiry. Kidd continues:
It is probably truistic to state that the performance of scientific enquiry, of whatever 
form, requires at least three things: enormous expenditure of resources, prolonged 
periods of time, and a community of enquirers  Given these facts, it is effectively 
impossible, in practice if not in principle, for a contingentist (or even a community of 
them) to produce an alternative scientific theory or tradition independently of such 
resources, time, and community (2016, 14).32
The PUP, then, asserts an inflated sense of our epistemic capabilities. Thus, in turn, the PUSU 
demand is based upon a hubristic presupposition. The practical and social realities of scientific 
inquiry render PUSU unanswerable, and unfairly so.
Solers (2015b) rejection of PUSU comes along with her meticulous formal analysis of 
the demand and the associated argumentative network (55-56), which I now reproduce:
The put-up-or-shut-up inevitabilist argument against contingentism
Premises:
(P1) The only convincing way to make contingentism plausible would be to exhibit an 
actual (i.e., not fictitious, but really existing) alternative science verifying the three 
conditions of genuine science, similar questions, and equal value.
(P2) Until now, contingentists have been unable to provide any such alternative.
Conclusion:
(C1) Until further notice, contingentism has no plausibility.
[...]
Auxiliary argument for inevitabilism:
32 Kidd here echoes remarks by Emiliano Trizio (2008, 258). Hasok Chang (2015, 360-62), is more optimistic on 
the possibility of cultivating alternative sciences; see also chapter 6 of his (2004).
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Premises:
(P3) Inevitabilism is the default position.
(P4) Contingentism, if it was plausible, could threaten inevitabilism as the default 
position, but (C1).
Conclusion: 
(C2) Inevitabilism is secured until further notice.
Having set out Solers scheme, we can now inquire as to her reasons for SUPU.33 They 
are twofold. One follows from the so-called monist regime which Soler sees as operating 
throughout the various levels of scientific inquiry. Our science is monist:
in the sense that the development of a multiplicity of alternatives is not valued and not 
socially encouraged and supported [O]ur epistemic activities, are governed by a 
monist ideal and a uniqueness commitment that seem deeply entrenched (2015b, 85).
The regime is manifest in our traditional obsession with unique theory choice, in the face of 
theoretical pluralism. As a result, multiple scientific accounts do not long hang around. The 
past action of this monist regime renders the history of science a thoroughly unpromising place 
for locating fruitful alternatives to our actual science (rarely were any allowed to develop), 
whilst its ongoing action all but excludes the possibility of potential put-ups being developed 
de novo.
Even if, despite the monist regime, contingentists are able to identify a promising put-
up, Soler explains that the inevitabilist holds all of the cards when it comes to evaluating its 
success. C/I scholars have long struggled with the unenviable task of defining and delineating 
the three conditions stipulated in P1: genuine science, similar questions, and equal value (e.g., 
Soler, 2008a; 2008b; Trizio, 2008; Kinzel, 2015). Often these exemplary analyses yield more 
questions than answers. Given these uncertainties over what constitutes a satisfactory put-up, 
it is all too easy for the inevitabilist to claim that the contingentists effort fails to meet one or 
more of the stated criteria (for details, see Soler, 2015b, 83-84).34 In the exceedingly rare case 
that the inevitabilist is forced to admit that a put-up alternative satisfies the stated criteria, they 
might finally fall back on the claim that this alternative is only-transiently-as-good as the 
actual science. [W]ith further time, further efforts and further evidence, one will prove 
superior to the other, as always (2015b, 77; see also 81-84). So goes Solers second reason for 
SUPU. As with Kidd, PUSU is unanswerable, but here because the inevitabilist will never 
concede that the demand has been satisfactorily met. Hence the contingentist should simply 
not worry about PUSU.
33 I am grateful for personal communications with Soler which have been invaluable in clarifying my 
understanding of her position.
34 For her part, Soler believes that Bohmian quantum mechanics represents a compelling put-up against the 
actually dominant Copenhagen interpretation (2015b, 75-77); see Cushing (1994).
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As they stand, Kidd and Solers reasons for SUPU seem to be good ones, and my aim 
here is not to pick holes in them.35 However, they might not be necessary. My contention is 
that if the C/I sphere does away with (relatively) global defaults of the kind criticised in sections 
2 and 3, then PUSU is a non-starter. Further, embracing localism breaks up the PUSU demand 
into indefinitely many local PUSU demands. In doing so, PUSUs distinctive argumentative 
and rhetorical force is all but lost, and the PUSU demand as it has stood so far in the C/I 
conversation is rendered a non-issue. 
5.2. SUPU: The case from (anti-)defaultism
Examining again Solers analytical PUSU framework, we can see that the commitment to 
inevitabilism-as-default  invalidated earlier in section 2, as well as being challenged in Solers 
own work  is made explicit in P3 of Solers above reconstruction of the PUSU argument, as 
one of the premises for the auxiliary argument for inevitabilism. On first appearances then, 
stripping inevitabilism of default-status bars the auxiliary argument for inevitabilism (and thus 
invalidates C2), but leaves the put-up-or-shut-up inevitabilist argument against contingentism 
(and the conclusion C1) untouched. This is not, though, the end of the story. The very ability 
of the inevitabilist to legitimately voice the PUSU argument against contingentism (P1-2; C1) 
is dependent upon the premise that inevitabilism does command an appreciable level of initial 
plausibility. Otherwise, inevitabilists would be under the same pressure to prove the credibility 
of their position as is the contingentist, and would hence be in no position to entirely saddle the 
latter with the burden of proof. We can highlight the action of inevitabilism-as-default thinking 
by filling in some unspoken aspects of Solers reconstruction. P1, for instance, might become 
P1* (my addition is underlined):
(P1*): The only convincing way to make contingentism plausible would be to exhibit 
an actual (i.e., non fictitious, but really existing) alternative science verifying the three 
conditions of genuine science, similar questions, and equal value. Inevitabilism, on the 
other hand, is prima facie highly plausible, and hence does not require such evincing!
Also clearly problematic  as Soler notes (2015b, 94)  is the stipulation, in P1, that 
putting-up is the only means by which contingentism can accrue plausibility. Note the 
asymmetry; inevitabilism is taken to possess some intrinsic plausibility which contingentism 
lacks, and must earn through the unenviable task of putting-up. The asymmetry reflects a 
misplaced sense of the superior initial plausibility of inevitabilism, and thus the PUSU 
argument cannot be legitimately levelled against the contingentist.36 For the inevitabilist to 
35 Forced to conjure criticisms, one might suggest that Kidds account does not adequately cover put-ups lifted 
from actual history of science (such as Bohmian QM); here the hubris of PUP might not apply so strongly. Further, 
one could put pressure on his pessimism concerning the cultivation of scientific alternatives, e.g. by drawing on 
Changs writings on complementary science: (2004, Chap. 6); (2015, 380-81). Countering Soler, one might 
claim that the writings of so-called descriptive pluralists bring into question the extent to which a monist 
regime is active in our science; see, e.g., essays in Kellert et al (2006). Soler anticipates this move (2015b, 96-
98).
36 Though I wont here, one could attempt to build a case which says that not only the premises, but also the 
criteria listed in P1 are symptomatic of a C/I argumentative landscape infused with the inevitabilist instinct. 
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demand that their opponent put-up-or-shut-up, the formers stance must legitimately occupy 
the default position, owing to its significant initial plausibility, or justified grounding through 
some other means. Such legitimation is currently lacking.
Doing away with defaults would mean inevitabilists are unable to legitimately level the 
PUSU demand. Hence, we do not get so far as needing Kidd and Solers arguments for PUSU 
being unfairly unanswerable. Is this the end of the story? Possibly not. Though first introduced 
by Hacking as a weapon in the inevitabilists arsenal, PUSUs association with the inevitabilist 
camp is a matter of convention, not necessity. We can imagine a contingentist reverse-PUSU 
levelled at the inevitabilist: You think the results of science are inevitable? Show me one 
instance in which things could not possibly have been otherwise That no such notion has 
been developed in the C/I literature likely represents yet another manifestation of the 
inevitabilism-as-default orthodoxy. In any case, we would have to reject reverse-PUSU on the 
same grounds as PUSU, unless, for instance, we follow Kidd and cede contingentism the 
significant initial plausibility required to enjoy default-status. In any case, I have suggested that 
embracing localism necessitates we steer clear of adopting (relatively) global positions such as 
these from the outset. 
What about someone agnostic about the C/I issue? Could they not co-opt the PUSU 
demand, supplemented by a modified auxiliary argument for agnosticism? Without the 
unjustified presupposition of inevitabilism-as-default, it is just possible that PUSU becomes 
askable, and the case for SUPU would have to employ Kidds charge that the PUP is hubristic, 
or Solers arguments from the monist regime, and from the unenviable difficulty of convincing 
ones interlocutor that a put-up satisfies the criteria of genuine science, similar questions, and 
equal value. We may note, however, that this last argument would be blunted were an agnostic 
behind the PUSU demand. This, because an agnostic would likely be far less invested in 
denying that a put-up satisfies the criteria in P1 (indeed, they might even entertain different 
criteria altogether; see note 36), and in mobilising the only-transiently-as-good reply. 
Furthermore, a good agnostic would level their put-up demand not just at contingentists, but 
also and equally at professed inevitabilists. These speculations aside, doing away with 
(relatively) global defaults of the kind criticised in section 2 renders the PUSU demand, as 
forwarded by the inevitabilist, a non-starter. 
 
5.3. SUPU: The case from localism
Making the SUPU case from localism will require us to go back and take a closer look at the 
passages in which Hacking first introduced the PUSU demand. Although he mostly anchored 
it in specific, local examples, Hackings conception of PUSU was a methodologically globalist 
one, as we will see. Fully and consciously embracing methodological localism breaks the 
PUSU demand into indefinitely many PUSU demands; as many as there are potential targets 
for C/I claims. Once we recognise this, the distinctive argumentative and rhetorical force of 
Perhaps if we were instinctively contingentist, or agnostic, about the results of science, we might have landed on 
different, maybe more inclusive, criteria for evaluating alternative sciences.
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PUSU is lost. In order to see the globalist methodology at play, it serves to quote Hacking at 
some length:
The constructionist maintains a contingency thesis. In the case of physics, (a) physics 
(theoretical, experimental, material) could have developed in, for example, a nonquarky 
way, and, by the detailed standards that would have evolved with this alternative 
physics, could have been as successful as recent physics has been by its detailed 
standards. Moreover, (b) there is no sense in which this imagined alternative physics 
would be equivalent to present physics. The physicist denies that. Physicists are 
inclined to say, put up or shut up. Show us an alternative development (1999, 78-79).
Buoyed, presumably, by Andrew Pickerings landmark Constructing Quarks (1984), 
Hackings contingentist claims that there could have been a successful nonquarky physics. This 
is a relatively local contingency claim; one which Hackings inevitabilist-physicist denies. I 
say relatively local because physics (theoretical, experimental, material), though more 
restricted than the results of science in general, is still a rather large domain. In any case, that 
Hackings imagined interlocutors are operating within a globalist methodology is made 
abundantly clear, as he continues:
The sticking point need not be at quarks. But some things definitely are noncontingent, 
say the physicists, and their appearance in physics was inevitable if science was to 
progress at all. When the physicists sticking point is placed under severe challenge, 
there are several fallback examples: Maxwells equations, the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, the velocity of light. The contingency claim is that neither the law 
nor the equations nor the velocity (nor anything equivalent) are inevitable parts of any 
science as successful as present science (1999, 79, my emphasis).
Hacking moves from talk of a (local, albeit it only relatively so) contingency claim to the 
(global) contingency claim. Hackings contingentist presumably takes claims of types A-D (to 
return to Martins scheme) for granted. As such, the contingency claim must be read as a claim 
about the whole damn thing. Not only might the interpretations and applications of science 
have been different, but, nothing equivalent to Maxwells equations, or the second law of 
thermodynamics  that is, no result of science  represents an inevitable part of a successful 
science. All scientific results are contingent. Correspondingly, his inevitabilists think that if 
successful physics took place, then it would inevitably have happened in something like our 
way (1999, 79). The commitment to the inevitability of any specific development (quarks, 
Maxwells equations, the second law of thermodynamics) is dropped from the characterisation 
of their view; these are but temporary sticking-points, in Hackings terminology, settled upon 
for their argumentative and rhetorical force. Hackings inevitabilist physicists are inevitabilist 
about physics done in our way, and all which that includes. Contingentists and inevitabilists, 
in Hackings picture, do not argue over local examples for their own sakes, but as part of a 
globalist strategy in order to uphold the contingency thesis, or the inevitability thesis, 
respectively.
This picture might well have served as a reasonable descriptive gloss at Hackings time 
of writing, in the wake of the so-called science wars of the 1990s. However, I am suggesting 
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that it is not a useful nor constructive one going forward. I have defended, instead, a 
commitment to methodological localism (section 4), wherein claims about the results of science 
in general cannot be supported on the basis of one or a few localised instances of contingency 
or inevitability. The scope of local C/I claims is just that  local. Hackings contingentists and 
inevitabilists, on this view, are putting the first-order globalist cart before the methodologically 
localist horse. Here, a reminder that  for reasons set out in section 4.2  it appears unlikely 
that any kind globalist cart would emerge, even after the methodologically localist horse has 
run its long course.
Due to its being methodologically global, then, the inevitabilist PUSU demand as 
Hacking introduced it has no place in the C/I conversation. Going back to Solers useful 
reconstruction, we can recall that, according to the inevitabilist:
(P1) The only convincing way to make contingentism plausible would be to exhibit an 
actual (i.e., not fictitious, but really existing) alternative science verifying the three 
conditions of genuine science, similar questions, and equal value (Soler, 2015b, 55).
The unfairly unanswerable nature of the demand notwithstanding, what it states in principle is 
that a single instance in which contingentism provides a compelling account can support, at 
least to some degree, a general contingentist stance about the results of science. This is 
methodological globalism to a T. The localist, without good reason, could not extrapolate from 
a successful put-up towards the plausibility of contingentism in general. The rampant 
diversity of the sciences, in matters metaphysical and methodological, renders such a move 
prohibitively risky, not to mention the limits on generality imposed by the strong situatedness, 
temporal and otherwise, of any given contingency claim (section 4.2). Perhaps the subject 
matter of a successful put-up is the only case of contingency in the results of science. It is 
unlikely, but we cannot rule it out. For the localist, then, all that is demonstrated by a successful 
put-up  assuming for now this feat is possible  is the plausibility of contingentism in that 
case.
Methodological localism, then, breaks up the PUSU demand into indefinitely many 
PUSU demands, each pertaining to one of the indefinitely many aspects of science about which 
one could make a C/I claim. As per the preceding sub-section (5.2), each of these demands 
could only be legitimately levelled by an agnostic. The PUSU demand, as originally conceived, 
has all but disappeared. It was introduced by Hacking as an off-the-shelf response which the 
inevitabilist could level against any contingentist challenger, in order to uphold their global 
inevitabilism about the development of science. The semblance of the PUSU demand which 
remains after doing away with defaults and embracing localism is barely recognisable in 
comparison to what Hacking originally proposed. It applies equally to the inevitabilist as well 
as the contingentist, can only be legitimately levelled by an agnostic, and the results are not 
extrapolatable beyond the restricted domain of the particular target. What more is this besides 
a call for careful historical-philosophical investigation of the emergence of particular results of 
science, and what does continuing to talk of it as the PUSU demand add? Not much, is my 
answer.
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6. Concluding remarks: The future of the C/I conversation
Arguably, I have simply reminded us of several things we already know about the C/I issue, 
and followed their implications further than we previously had. When it comes to the question 
of whether the results of science are contingent or inevitable, adopting either extreme as default 
is without justification (section 2), and methodologically suspect (section 3). Further, given the 
rampant diversity of the sciences, and the complex, conditional, and time-dependent nature of 
C/I claims, we have little reason to anticipate a one-size-fits-all solution. Methodological 
localism seems the appropriate approach to grappling with C/I issues in a domain as complex 
and heterogeneous as science and its historical development. This leaves open all manner of 
possible first-order positions, combining contingentisms about certain elements, and 
inevitabilisms about others, as well as the possibility that at time T1 an aspect of science was 
contingent, but by T2 it was inevitable, or vice versa (Giere, 2015, 188). As we saw above, the 
PUSU demand has little place in such a C/I landscape.
Some readers may be thinking: tackling the C/I issue in a localist spirit from an agnostic 
starting-point is all very well in principle, but what does it mean in practice? What are the 
constructive lessons? There are straightforward upshots of my discussion: we should, for 
instance, treat manifestations of defaultism and globalism with suspicion. But what about when 
it comes to the doing of methodologically localist C/I scholarship? How can we go about 
demonstrating the contingency/inevitability of some result of science? Much like in the realism 
case, it is a matter of drawing upon existing tools, and utilising them in a localist spirit. I gather 
here three promising extant suggestions:
(1) Counterfactual history. The most widely-considered means of displaying the 
contingency of a scientific result is to construct an alternative historical narrative of 
how things might have gone otherwise (for analyses and examples, see Radick, 2008; 
Bowler, 2013; Hesketh, 2016). Though counterfactual history of science is lastingly 
controversial, Radick urges that we can either debate its possibility or get on with the 
job (2016, 153). We are seeing scholars take the latter option (Dagg, 2017), whilst 
methodological discussions increasingly turn from whether counterfactual history of 
science is possible, to questions of what it can do for us. And the news is not all bad. 
Luca Tambolo, for instance, has recently concluded that counterfactual histories can 
support weak contingency claims about science (for details, see Tambolo, 2018, 
Section 5).
(2) Active pluralism, or, cultivating alternatives. Hasok Chang suggests that we can 
productively reconceive inevitability as unavoidability (2015, 360). How do we know 
if a scientific result is inevitable/unavoidable? We try to avoid it. We actively attempt 
to cultivate alternative systems of knowledge in any given area of science. Our ability 
to sustain a reasonable alternative will be a function of both the 
contingency/inevitability of the result, and the time, resources, and efforts which we 
devote to our attempts. Hence, it is not quite right to say that any given result of science 
is either inevitable or not (360). Straightforward conclusions may be hard to come by, 
then, especially if we share Kidds scepticism concerning our ability to cultivate 
alternatives (section 5.1). Chang turns this scepticism on its head:
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[I]f you had a situation in which even nonexperts (such as philosophers) can 
come up with viable alternatives, then you would know for sure that the 
scientific orthodoxy is not inevitable (361).
Inevitability appears harder, in principle, to demonstrate in this way; we could always 
increase our efforts to cultivate an alternative. We might conclude, though, that a result 
is inevitable/unavoidable given a certain level of effort to avoid it; beyond that level, 
we cannot speculate.
(3) Convergence in the history of science. In his (2005) essay, Radick suggested 
historical convergence upon a scientific result as a means of establishing its 
inevitability. Working with the example of the triple-rediscovery of Mendelism in 
1900, Radick reasoned that:
The greater the number of past trajectories that converged on the same 
conclusion, and the greater the independence of those trajectories, the more 
plausible will be the idea that the conclusion was inevitable (26).
The criteria for deciding when any of the above have provided a sufficiently warranted 
demonstration of contingency/inevitability will surely inspire debate. But such kinds of issues 
are not unique to the C/I domain. At least in a landscape rid of defaultism, the burden of proof 
will not sit so heavy, and the criteria of judgment will perhaps not be so unjust, nor enforced 
so belligerently.37 Embracing methodological localism makes it unlikely we will hit upon any 
simple (global) answer to the question: Are the results of science contingent or inevitable? 
Indeed, this one question is replaced by indefinitely many. To paraphrase Radick (2016, 153) 
 himself channelling Steven Shapin (1982, 157)  we can either debate the possibilities of 
answering these questions, or we can get on with the job.
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Highlights
 Inevitabilism has served as the default position in the contingency/inevitability issue.
 We should do away with default positions in the contingency/inevitability 
conversation.
 Methodological localism is defended as the best approach to the 
contingency/inevitability issue.
 A novel dismissal of the put up or shut up demand is developed.
